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Broker-Dealer Disclosure of Corporate
Inside Information
James K. Weeks* and Jeffrey V. McCormick**
T HE PROBLEM OF WHEN, how and where to utilize inside information so
as to avoid legal consequences of untimely or improper disclosure
has been of considerable concern to corporate officials very recently.
Prior to 1968 many business executives apparently felt that it would
not be improper to take advantage of inside information for their own
personal gain, and perhaps to let a few close friends in on the informa-
tion as well.'
Although the individual attitude of corporate officials today toward
the use of inside information may not have changed as a matter of per-
sonal ethics, there can be little doubt that recent events have superseded
personal values and imposed a vague legal requirement in their stead.
The boundaries of this new standard are not fixed. It has confused rather
than clarified an already murky issue.
The alternatives open to insiders, corporate employees and their tip-
pees have seemingly polarized themselves, at least in the minds of some
businessmen, to either telling nothing to anyone or shouting even the
most insignificant (although significance or insignificance is more often
than not determined by hindsight) bit of corporate news from the pro-
verbial housetops. However, there exists a large middle ground, which
requires exploration to establish and formulate guidelines and rules re-
garding the proper disposition and use of corporate inside information.
The actualities are that it is not necessarily an "either/or" proposition
and that in fact there may still be a considerable body of inside infor-
mation which under proper circumstances may be acted upon without
the initial soul baring thought to be presently required.
If the responses to the abovementioned Harvard Business Review
questionnaire are indicative, a large number of corporate executives ap-
pear to have few qualms about utilization of such information for their
own gain, and certainly no reservations regarding the avarice of their
peers.2
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
** Third-year student at Syracuse University College of Law.
1 Barnhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 Harv. Bus. Rev. 6 (1961).
2 1,700 executives responded to a question regarding the use they would make of
information gleaned from a Board of Directors meeting which indicated that a pro-
posed merger plan, as yet undisclosed to the public, made the purchase of stock of
the proposed "mergee" highly profitable (the stock was selling low but was certain
to rise upon public disclosure of the merger) as follows:
(Continued on next page)
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The above responses indicate that ".... a surprising, and perhaps
shocking, number of executives feel that it is perfectly reasonable con-
duct to use inside information for their personal benefit." 3 The inad-
visability of following such a course of action as the Harvard survey
indicates is well expressed in a New York Stock Exchange Educational
Circular which defines the policy of the Exchange in such situations. The
following excerpt exemplifies the feeling of the Exchange: 4
Every director has a fiduciary obligation not to reveal any privileged
information to anyone not authorized to receive it. Not until there
is full public disclosure of such date, particularly when the infor-
mation might have a bearing on the market price of the securities,
is a director released from the necessity of keeping information of
this character to himself. Any director of a corporation who is a
partner, officer, or employee of a member organization should recog-
nize that his first responsibility in this area is to the corporation on
whose Board he serves. Thus, a member firm director must meticu-
lously avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners,
employees of the firm, his customers or his research or trading
departments.
Furthermore, the same rules should be considered applicable where
a representative of a member organization is not a director but is acting
in any other advisory capacity. 5 Therefore, the policies of those whose
duty it is to regulate the securities market would appear to be in direct
conflict with the prevailing attitude in the corporate community. In
light of this conflict, it should be of some assistance to examine the ap-
propriate legislative and judicial approaches to the problems of main-
taining an open market for the purchase and sale of securities.
(Continued from preceding page)
Would buy for themselves ---- 42%
Would tell a broker ---------- 2%
Would tell a friend ---------- 14%
Would do nothing ---- ------- 56%
But when asked what they thought others would do answered as follows:
Buy themselves ------------- 61%
Tell a broker --------------- 11%
Tell a friend --------------- 46%
Do nothing ---------------- 29%
S Cary, The Direction of Management Responsibility, 18 Bus. Law. 29, at 33 (1962-3).
For a survey of the governmental views, see, 2 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, c.
34 (Government Regulation of Securities), c. 35 (Securities Markets), c. 36 (Secu-
rities Problems of Small Corporations) (1959, with 1965 supp.).
4 New York Stock Exchange Member Firm Educational Circular No. 162 of June 22,
1962. And see, supra, Oleck, c. 29 (Methods of Corporation Financing, Generally),
and c. 42 (Directors' and Officers' Conflicts of Interests).
5 "Expanded Policy of Timely Disclosure," New York Stock Exchange-Company
Manual, at A-21 (1968).
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The Case Against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith
The recent administrative proceeding of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith, Inc.6 is representative of the problems faced by the brokerage
community in the area of disclosure of corporate information following
the recent case of SEC v. Texas, Gulf & Sulphur Co., et al.7 The SEC
alleges in its complaint in Merrill Lynch that during the period from
June 17, 1966 through June 24, 1966 Merrill Lynch violated and willfully
aided and abetted violations of Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of
1933,8 Sections 10b 9 and 15(c) (1)10 of the Exchange Act, and Rules
10b-5 1 and 15cl-212 thereunder in connection with the sale and purchase
of Douglas Aircraft securities. Merrill Lynch, because of its position as
prospective managing underwriter 13 of a Douglas offering of convertible
subordinated debentures, obtained from Douglas management nonpublic
material information that Douglas would report sharply lower earnings
for the first six months of the 1966 fiscal year and that Douglas had
sharply reduced its estimates of earnings for 1966 and its projections of
earnings for 1967. Acting upon this information, Merrill Lynch disclosed
these reports to a number of its institutional investors and other large
customers who were also included in the complaint. Several of these
customers thereafter sold Douglas stock from existing positions and
effected short sales of more than 19,000 shares of Douglas stock on the
New York Stock Exchange and otherwise, prior to public disclosure of
the information and without informing the purchasers of the stock of the
decline in earnings. If the allegations of the SEC are found to be true,
then the SEC has requested remedial action in the public interest under
6 In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.; CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
177,596 (complaint filed August 26, 1968).
7 401 F. 2d 833; CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 192,251 (2d Cir. 1968). The Texas, Gulf &
Sulphur litigation involves the discovery of an ore deposit near Timmins, Ontario,
Canada. The area was first thought to have promise in 1959 and in 1963 the drilling
of the first test holes began. On November 12, 1963 preliminary drilling of the first
hole was completed, which indicated a valuable deposit of ore. Public announcement
of the discovery was not made until April 16, 1964, but in the meantime numerous
insiders had been actively purchasing shares of stock in anticipation of substantial
gains. These insiders were held by the court to have violated the antifraud pro-
visions of the securities laws.
8 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a).
9 Ibid. § 78j (b).
10 Id. § 78o(c) (1).
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
12 Ibid. § 240.15cl-2.
13 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(b). The term underwriter means any person who has purchased
from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation
in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indi-
rect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such a term shall not include a per-
son whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in
excess of the usual and customary distributor's or seller's commission. ...
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Sections 15 (b) ,14 15A 15 and 19 (a) (3)16 of the Exchange Act and Section
20317 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
Who Is Required To Disclose
Before examining what is required to be disclosed, it is of interest
to determine who has the duty to make disclosure and when. In this re-
spect Rule 10b-5, which is directed primarily against misrepresentations
and nondisclosures, should be consulted, and particularly the language,
"any person" appearing in the first line. The future application of the
Rule will be determined by the extent to which the courts and the Com-
mission apply the language "any person." 18 Although the language prob-
ably will not be literally applied, the courts have come a long way since
1952 when a representative of the SEC expressed the then prevailing
interpretation of the language "any person" as follows: 19
Mr. Byrne: They (SEC) agree 100% that an insider cannot take
advantage of a stockholder of his company in connection with the
purchase from him or the sale to him of the company's stock where
he has information not known to that man on the other side of the
transaction because of his fiduciary obligation to disclose it to him.
I do not believe, however, the Commission takes the second and
third steps in their current consideration of X1OB5, and by second
and third steps I mean this: that insider could communicate to an
outsider the same information he knows, and the outsider might act
on it and unless the Commission had evidence from which they could
conclude that the insider was a party in fact to the transaction, either
acted in concert with or conspiracy with the outsider, I do not think
that they would hold the outsider as being in violation of Rule
X1OB5; and your third case is what I call the locker-room case . . .
where a fellow at the golf club overhears the insider talking to a
friend of his and he himself acts on the basis of the information he
heard and that case I do not think the Commission would touch at
all at this stage of its existence.
Mr. Heller: Would they hold the insider?
Mr. Byrne: They would hold the insider without question in the
first case; in the second and third cases they would not hold the out-
sider who had the inside information, unless they could show a con-
spiracy or concert of action with the insider, in which event they
14 15 U.S.C-A. § 78o. Suspension and Revocation of Registration.
15 Ibid. § 78o-3. Suspension and Expulsion from Membership in the National Secu-
rities Association.
16 Id. § 78s. Suspension and Expulsion from Membership in National Securities Ex-
change.
17 Id. § 80b-3.
18 Note, Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady,
Roberts Doctrine, 30 Chi. L. Rev. 121, at 136 (1962).
19 Peter T. Byrne, Director of the Division of Trading and Exchanges, in "Study of
the Securities & Exchange Commission." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, pp.
725-26 (1952).
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would hold both of them, and in no event would they hold the locker
room man.
In 1961, in the case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 20 the Commission
went well beyond the view that a "concert or conspiracy" was necessary
to hold the outsider. As described by the Chairman of the SEC, Cady,
Roberts was ".... a case of first impression and one of signal importance
in our administration of the Federal securities acts." 21 The decision held
that a partner in a brokerage firm who had learned of a dividend cut by
Curtiss-Wright from an employee of the firm who was also a director of
Curtiss-Wright violated Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule
10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1943, by executing sell
orders for discretionary accounts22 on the New York Stock Exchange
prior to the public announcement of the reduction.
The decision is important for several reasons: First, it was clearly
established that nondisclosure was an "act, practice or course of busi-
ness" operating as a fraud or deceit within the meaning of clause 3 of
Rule 10b-5. Second, the case held that the Rule could reach nondisclo-
sure by persons who were not "insiders" at common law. Third, the
Commission found that a duty of disclosure was owed even in sales to
unidentified persons on a public exchange. Fourth, the Commission ex-
pressed the view that the duty of disclosure owed to the public was
greater than the broker's fiduciary responsibility to his discretionary
accounts. And finally, it disclosed an awareness of the importance of the
development of implied civil liability.
Of all of these, the aspect of the case which would appear to have
the greatest impact was the extension of the rules on who must disclose
other than the traditional insiders which included officers, directors and
controlling shareholders. The Commission observed:
We have already noted that the antifraud provisions are phrased
in terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has been tra-
ditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors and
controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do not ex-
haust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation.
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements: first,
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such infor-
mation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
... Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited.23
20 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
21 Id., at 907.
22 A discretionary account is one for which the broker has the power to conduct
transactions at his discretion without first obtaining the specific permission of the
account holder. See Leffler, The Stock Market, 166-167 (2d ed. 1957).
23 Supra note 20, at 912.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
18 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3)
Prior to Cady, Roberts the court had not stressed the use of the
phrase "any person," however, Rule 10b-5 had been applied to brokers
where they had made and caused others to make false and misleading
statements of material facts, 24 or where a broker has omitted to state
a material fact,25 or finally where a brokerage firm which was dominated
by a partner who was also a director of a company which issued certain
securities, induced the sale of such securities by material misrepresenta-
tions and misleading omissions as to the assets and prospects of the
issuer.
26
It therefore does not require much stretch of the imagination to
include an underwriter of an issuance of stock or convertible debentures,
such as Merrill Lynch, within that class of persons who have access to
information intended for a corporate purpose, and where such person has
unfairly taken advantage of such information as where large customers
and institutional investors are advised of a decline in earnings before it
is made public, and purchasers of the same securities are not provided
with the same information. The duty applies not only to brokers affil-
iated with a director of an issuer as in Cady, Roberts, but also to "any
person" in possession of material undisclosed information.27 A broker
may also be liable for violation of 10b-5 if he aids an insider to violate
the Rule.28
Thus, the ultimate test of whether an individual is within that class
of persons upon whom there is a duty to disclose or, in the absence of
disclosure, to refrain from trading in a corporation's securities is whether
or not that person has access to material inside information.
What Facts Are To Be Considered Material?
Where there is no disclosure, in order to hold an insider liable,
whether he is a director, officer, major stockholder, employee or broker,
the misstatement or unfair use of nonpublic information must be of a
material fact. This requirement of materiality is necessary to protect
against an outsider's use of the insider's misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure "as a pretext for escaping a bargain that [the outsider] is dissatis-
fied with on other grounds." 29
The test to be applied in determining when a fact is material was
expressed in Kohler v. Kohler" as a fact "which in reasonable and ob-
jective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or
24 In the Matter of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952).
25 Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 174 F. 2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
26 R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773 (1944).
27 Supra note 7, at 848.
28 Flom, Garfinkel & Freund, Disclosure Requirements of Public Companies and In-
siders, 171 (1967).
29 Keeton, Actionable Misrepresentation, 2 Okla. L. Rev. 56, at 59 (1949).
30 319 F. 2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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securities .... ," 31 However, in applying this test, the court refused to
hold defendants liable where plaintiff had sold his stock in the corpora-
tion back to the issuer alleging that he was induced to do so by mis-
representation by the defendant corporation and the accountant who was
retained to negotiate the sale of stock. The court held that there was no
breach of duty on the part of the accountant in failing to volunteer de-
tails of a pension plan or of an accounting method as to how annuities
were funded on the books of the corporation even though a different
method, if adopted, would have increased the book value of the company.
The court reasoned that insiders "are not required to search out details
that presumably would not influence the person's judgment with whom
they are dealing." 32
The test is essentially whether a reasonable man would attach im-
portance to the facts if known in determining what course of action he
should pursue in the management of his investments. 33
The courts have had several opportunities to decide what facts are
to be considered material. Some of these situations include: the fact
that a control group had a purchaser for all of the corporate assets that
would result in a higher price for the stock than that paid to the out-
sider who owned the stock; 34 or where a reduction of the dividend rate
was undertaken in order to depress the price of the stock to facilitate the
purchase of the stock by a control group at a lower price; 35 and where
there is a significant improvement in the business condition of a com-
pany;36 or a proposed private and public offering of a company's shares
at prices greatly in excess of the price at which they were purchased
from an outside shareholder.37
In addition to and including those areas which the courts have con-
sidered to be material, the New York Stock Exchange has included nego-
tiations leading to acquisitions and mergers, stock splits, the making of
arrangements preparatory to an exchange or tender offer, changes in
dividend rates or earnings, calls for redemption, new contracts, products,
or discoveries. 38
31 Id., at 642.
32 Id., at 642.
33 Supra note 7, at 848, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F. (2d) 457 (2d Cir.) cert. den.
382 U.S. 811, 86 Sup. Ct. 83, 15 L. Ed. (2d) 60. Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F. (2d) 260
at 266-67 (1st Cir. 1966).
34 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
35 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
36 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F. 2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
37 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). Also see, Ward La France Truck
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.
1951); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill.
1952); Mills v. Sarjiem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.J. 1955).
38 Supra note 5, at A-19.
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The mere fact that material information exists of which top manage-
ment and their confidential advisers, such as underwriters, have knowl-
edge, does not mean that it must be immediately disclosed to the public.
As was indicated in footnote number 12 39 of Texas, Gulf & Sulphur,
where a corporate purpose is served by nondisclosure of a material fact,
public announcement may properly be avoided. However, adequate secu-
rity to prevent leaks of the material information should be maintained
which requires that market action in a company's securities should be
closely watched, and if unusual market activity should occur, then the
company should be prepared to make an immediate public announce-
ment of the matter.40
In Merrill Lynch the underwriter's alleged knowledge that Douglas
would report sharply lower earnings would surely seem to fit within the
tests offered for determining materiality. The fact that certain of the
institutional investors and other large customers of Merrill Lynch acted
upon the information would appear to be evidence that a reasonable man
would have attached importance to the facts if known. Since nonpublic
information possessed by a broker is likely to influence any transaction
in which he is engaged, the most satisfactory solution would be to place
a duty upon the broker to disclose all material inside information as soon
as he practically can.41 In the alternative the broker should refrain from
dealing in the company's securities until there has been adequate public
disclosure.
Implied Civil Liability for Violation of 1Ob-5 by Insiders
and Their Tippees.
Not only may the SEC act on violations of the federal securities
laws, but defrauded parties to a transaction have also been held to have
a cause of action. Under the common law of deceit, where the parties
dealt at arms length and there was no existing fiduciary duty, liability
was imposed only for misrepresentations or for omission to state a ma-
terial fact which, in light of the statements made, make such statements
misleading. However, mere nondisclosure did not constitute any breach
of duty.4 2 However, where a fiduciary relationship existed at common
law as between a broker and his client,43 the courts were not consistent
in the duty which they imposed. The majority rule held that an officer
or director of a corporation only owed a fiduciary duty to his company
39 Supra note 7, at 850.
40 Supra note 5, at A-19.
41 Note, Broker Silence and Rule 10b-5: Expanding the Duty to Disclose, 71 Yale L.
Rev. 736, at 746 (1962).
42 Prosser, Torts § 101 (3d ed. 1964).
43 Note, SEC Rule 10b-5 Invoked to Suspend Broker Who Failed to Disclose InsideInformation When Selling on National Exchange, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 735, at 737(1962).
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and that in stock transactions with shareholders he could deal at arm's
length as if with a stranger.44 On the other hand, a minority rule devel-
oped which required the insider to disclose all material facts concerning
the value of shares known to him but not a matter of public informa-
tion. 45 Still another approach at common law was to impose a duty to
deal fairly and disclose all known material facts in face-to-face trans-
actions where the insider personally sought out the shareholder to buy
his shares. 46 This last approach resulted as an exception to the majority
view and was applied by the Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide47 even
where the transaction was handled by a broker. The court in that case
imposed a duty on corporate officials to disclose "special facts" affecting
the value of shares. However, no court at common law held there was
a duty to disclose inside information when a transaction was effected on
a stock exchange.
48
The laxity of standards applicable to insider trading eventually re-
sulted in federal legislation, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
which was made applicable to both purchases and sales of securities.
Despite the contention that Rule 10b-5 was not intended to create civil
liability and was meant only to give rise to injunctive relief or to pos-
sibly administrative remedies, it has been held ever since Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co.,40 decided in 1946, that Rule 10b-5 carries with it
implied civil liability.
The rule still exists that where there is no fiduciary relationship
nondisclosure of a material fact is not actionable.6 0 However, where
a fiduciary relationship exists insiders have a duty to disclose material
facts which would affect the value of shares when they have knowledge
of material inside information which is unknown to the other party. As
expressed by Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion in Texas, Gulf &
Sulphur, "Silence, when there is a duty to speak, can itself be a fraud." 51
In order to award compensatory damages for violation of lOb-5 and
17 (a), the jury must find that the defendants made:
(1) False or misleading statements (2) with respect to material
facts (3) with knowledge that the statements were false or mis-
leading, or of the existence of facts which, if disclosed, would reveal
them to be false or misleading, and that (4) the plaintiffs relied upon
44 Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
45 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903).
46 Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916).
47 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
48 R. Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 10 Corp. Prac. Commentator 111, at 114
(1968).
49 Supra note 34.
50 Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
51 Supra note 7, at 865.
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the statements as substantial factors in determining their course of
conduct (as distinguished from justifiable reliance) (5) with result-
ing damage. 52
The element of scienter which must be established in a civil action
where the parties deal at arm's length 53 need not be established when
there is a fiduciary relationship either against the purchaser or seller.
Proof of specific intent to defraud in such situations is unnecessary
whether the action is an SEC enforcement proceeding or a private civil
suit.5
4
The test for reliance which the plaintiff must establish is whether
the misrepresentation or nondisclosure was a "substantial factor in de-
termining the course of conduct which results in (the plaintiff's) loss." 55
And finally, it should be noted that privity of contract is no longer a
necessary element to be established in a suit for damages under 10b-5.
In Gann v. Bernzomatic Corp.56 plaintiff brought an action alleging that
defendants distributed untrue and misleading statements and induced
members of the public to purchase stock which the defendants were
anxious to unload. Plaintiffs purchased the stock over an 18-month
period in reliance on defendants' representations, and the court held that
even though no allegation was made that plaintiff purchased the par-
ticular shares which the defendant sold, a cause of action existed. Al-
though the defendants relied on Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Tele-
vision Corp.5 7 which required a "semblance of privity," the court sug-
gested that an allegation of reliance might be sufficient.
Not only may compensatory or actual damages be awarded in a civil
action, but in addition punitive damages are proper if the requisite tests
are met. In Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. 58 the jury was in-
structed that if, in addition to the above five elements of a civil action,
they found that the
fraudulent conduct involved a high degree of moral culpability,
wanton dishonesty, moral terpitude, gross fraud and deceit upon the
public and a wanton indifference to one's obligations, punitive dam-
ages might be awarded in addition to compensatory damages. 59
52 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, at 194 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
53 Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (D. Colo. 1965);
Weber v. CMP Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
54 Supra note 7, at 97,183; supra note 52; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (9th Cir. 1962).
Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,674 (D. Ill., 1966).
55 Restatement of Torts, § 546 (1938).
56 262 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); see also Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F. (2d) 242 (6th Cir. 1962). Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 266 F.
Supp. 972 at 978 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
57 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F. 2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
58 Supra note 52.
59 Id., at 194.
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In Globus the court found that there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port an award of punitive damages where there was a violation of 17(a).
The court found that an underwriter of a public offering of 100,000
shares of common stock of Law Research Service, Inc. prepared an offer-
ing circular which described the company's business as "a law infor-
mation retrieval program for the legal profession by applying computer
technology to the problems of legal research." However, the circular
failed to mention the fact that a five-year contract with Sperry-Rand
Corporation, under which Sperry-Rand was to provide programming and
computer time and which contract was an attractive feature to the public,
had been recently terminated by Sperry-Rand. The circular further
omitted reference to the fact that Law Research had instituted a law
suit against Sperry-Rand for breach of contract, fraud and deceit, spe-
cific performance and conspiracy. Based on the above facts, the court
upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiffs for both compensatory and puni-
tive damages.
A Section 10 (b) action may be brought pursuant to Section 27 60 by
the Commission or by any party claiming to have been defrauded. There
is no longer much doubt but that the insider may be held liable where
he profits from material inside information or where he is found to have
informed others. The Circuit Court in Texas, Gulf & Sulphur clearly
established the culpability of tippers when it held that Darke (a de-
fendant) violated Rule 10b-5 (3) and section 10 (b) by "tipping" and
remanded ". . . for a determination of the appropriate remedy." 61 The
next question is whether a "tippee" who benefits from a tip is also liable
for damages. The complaint in Merrill Lynch included a number of
investors who allegedly sold Douglas stock following the tip by Merrill
Lynch as to the decline in earnings. The question thus is whether these
tippees may be held accountable to the uninformed purchasers of the
stock. Although there is a greater reluctance to apply the fraud pro-
visions of the securities acts to the tipper-tippee situation,62 the Texas,
Gulf & Sulphur opinion is of interest on the extent of a tippee's liability.
It would seem that a tippee does commit an unlawful act within the
meaning of 10b-5 when he uses material, undisclosed information
". . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . ." when
such a transaction ". . . would operate as a fraud or deceit . . ." upon the
other party. The access test as expressed in Cady, Roberts and Texas,
Gulf & Sulphur would appear to encompass not only the first-hand re-
cipients of inside information, but the second-hand recipients as well.
The culpability of tippees, although not an issue in Texas, Gulf & Sul-
phur, was discussed by the court:
60 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa.
61 Supra note 7, at 864.
62 J. Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur,
28 Md. L. Rev. 189, at 198 (1968).
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As Darke's (a defendant) 'tippees' are not defendants in this action,
we need not decide whether, if they acted with 
actual or construc-
tive knowledge that the material information was 
undisclosed, their
conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the 
conduct of their
insider source, though we note that it certainly 
could be equally
reprehensible.
3
Support for holding tippees liable may 
be found in Ross v. Licht
6 4
where the court was willing to hold tippees liable 
even though they
might not be considered insiders. The tippees in 
Ross v. Licht were close
friends of a family which controlled a corporation. 
The tippees purchased
the plaintiff's stock at $120 per share without disclosing 
a proposed pri-
vate sale of the stock at $300 per share and a proposed 
public offering
of the stock at $600 per share. The court concluded that:
If Sidney, Grapel and Bluestone (the defendants) were not insiders,
they would seem to have been tippees (persons given information
by insiders in breach of trust) and subject to the same duty 
as
insiders.... And in any event, Sidney, Grapel and 
Bluestone would
be equally liable with the other defendants for 
aiding and abetting
a violation of Rule 10b-5.
' 5
After consideration of the relevant law on the 
insider's and tippee's
civil liability for violation of 10 (b), 10b-5 and 17 (a), it 
would appear
that if the facts alleged in the complaint against 
Merrill Lynch were
established 66 then a private cause of action would 
seem to exist for the
purchasers, who were not informed of the decline 
in earnings, against
Merrill Lynch as an inside tipper and the selling 
investors as tippees.
This does not mean that anyone who buys or sells 
based on a tip should
be held liable in private suits or in proceedings 
by the Commission.
Since implicit in the access test is the idea that 
violation should depend
on knowledge, whether actual or constructive, that 
the material undis-
closed information came from a company source. 
Even though the tippee
may escape liability because he is not a knowing 
confederate, the opin-
ion in Texas, Gulf & Sulphur implies that the tipper may be 
subject to
liability for the profits derived by the tippee from the 
transaction .67 Thus,
it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Merrill 
Lynch could be held
accountable for the losses suffered by the purchasers 
of Douglas stock.
63 Supra note 7, at 97,181.
64 Ross v. Licht, supra note 37.
G5 Id., at 410.
66 The SEC staff and Merrill Lynch appear to have settled 
their differences without
an administrative hearing, according to The Wall Street 
Journal, November 27, 1968.
67 Supra note 48, at 132.
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Guides for Future Conduct
Corporate insiders are normally in the best position to determine the
value of their securities. Brokers and dealers, although less favorably
situated, are still in a more advantageous position than the ordinary
investor. Therefore, the corporate insider and the corporation should be
expected to exercise more care and have a broader duty of disclosure
than that owed by brokers and dealers, who in turn have a greater duty
to disclose material information than the ordinary investor who may not
have any greater duty than existed at common law, which was usually
no duty at all unless he fit into the class of persons described as tippees
who are aware of the source of their information.
Where a broker arrives at a decision "as a result of perceptive
analysis of generally known facts" 68 there should be no danger of inter-
vention by the Commission or of imposition of civil liability. However,
as a general rule insider responsibilities should be imposed where the
recipient of the information knows, or has reason to know, that the in-
formant has violated a duty to the corporation in divulging the informa-
tion.69 Where inside information is acquired, then the primary duty of
a broker must be governed by his inside position, rather than by any
conflicting fiduciary duties. It therefore follows that if disclosure would
be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, then the alternative
is to forego the transaction.7 0
The view has been expressed that the rules of disclosure may result
in a withdrawal of brokers from positions as corporate directors.7 This
view is based on the feeling that there is too great a risk that innocent
transactions will coincide with new corporate developments and that
brokers will then face either civil liabilities, SEC administrative pro-
ceedings or both. However, withdrawal of brokers from corporate boards
of directors would be undesirable since their opinions can be of great
value to companies and to the financial world as a whole. It would fur-
ther seem that the courts will be unwilling to extend liability to this
extreme, and that something in addition to mere coincidence of a trans-
action with a new development would be required to establish a violation
of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts. 72 Not only does it seem
unnecessary for brokers to withdraw from directorships, but the New
York Stock Exchange Company Manual would also allow insiders to
trade in their company's stock under certain limited circumstances. The
Exchange has outlined three situations when they feel trading by in-
siders would be proper which include: (1) where a periodic investment
68 Supra note 20, at 915.
69 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1454 (2d ed. 1961).
70 Supra note 20, at 911.
71 Phelps, Hazards of the Stock Market, Atlantic Monthly (April 1962), pp. 80-81.
72 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
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program is established under which the officer or director or presumably
any other insider makes regular purchases at predetermined intervals,
or (2) where purchases and sales are made during the 30-day period
commencing one week after the annual report has been mailed to stock-
holders, provided that all corporate developments have been adequately
disclosed, and (3) where the insider, prior to making a purchase or sale,
contacts the chief executive officer of the company to determine if there
are any important developments which should be disclosed before par-
ticipating in the transaction. 73
If trading in a security of a company in which a person is an insider
is sanctioned by the New York Stock Exchange as indicated above, then
what happens when a broker, through his own financial analysis, arrives
at a decision to buy or sell and before taking action he receives inside
material information which confirms the decision he has already made?
Although Cady, Roberts implied that a broker might not be disciplined
for implementing a decision arrived at prior to the acquisition of inside
information, it would seem that some overt act would be required to
effect the transaction if liability were to be avoided.14 Such a require-
ment might seem unfair, but the goals in regulation of the securities
market and the need for fairness in all transactions are sufficiently
important to warrant such action. In addition, this requirement is con-
sistent with the view that a broker is also a guardian of the securities
market and that there are times when his duty as a policeman is greater
than his fiduciary duty to his clients and their desire to reap the bene-
fits of his analysis. 75 Although the primary responsibility for the prompt
public release of material inside information is on the issuer, this does
not relieve a broker of his duties to the uninformed public.76
Whether a broker serves as a director, underwriter, market maker,
securities analyst or publisher of market reports, if at any time he re-
ceives material inside information, he should act with caution. This cau-
tion will vary somewhat depending on the degree of his involvement in
a particular transaction. Since a broker's activities may range from
trading for his own account to merely executing a client's independent
decision, it would be helpful to examine whether the disclosure require-
ments are the same in all circumstances. After the above analysis, there
should be little doubt that a broker may not trade for his own account
without full public disclosure by the issuer of all material facts which
he is also in possession of because of his inside position. The same rea-
soning would apply where a broker is trading for a discretionary account
as was indicated by the opinion of the court in Cady, Roberts. Even
73 Supra note 5, at A-25.
74 Supra note 41, at 745.
75 SEC Release No. 6668, p. 12.
76 Supra note 20, at 915.
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where the broker offers advice and the client then makes the decision
for himself whether or not to undertake a purchase or sale, disclosure
should be a prerequisite to executing the transaction. Only where the
broker is merely executing a client's independently conceived decision
should the disclosure requirements be relaxed, and in such a case the
broker's duty should be no greater than his client's. 77
Even where disclosure of all material facts is made to the investor
and to the public, the duty of the broker to his client is not yet termi-
nated, since a broker also has the responsibility to be certain that his
recommendations are based on actual knowledge and are not more opti-
mistic or pessimistic than the facts reveal. As was pointed out in a per
curiam decision by the SEC In the Matter of Alexander Reid & Co.,
Inc.7 8 :
A broker-dealer in his dealings with customers impliedly represents
that his opinions and predictions respecting a stock which he had
undertaken to recommend are responsibly made on the basis of
actual knowledge and careful consideration.
Conclusion
The implementation by brokers of the disclosure requirements and
the present policies of the New York Stock Exchange should result in
greater fairness to all investors and a more orderly securities market.
Brokers and companies alike should adopt a policy not to give infor-
mation to one investor when they are unwilling to give the same infor-
mation to another investor. And beyond this, both the issuer and the
broker who has material inside information should take the responsibility
to see that all material information is released to the financial press as
soon as possible so as to avoid the possibility of leaks which could result
in disciplinary action and possible civil liability.
The recent decisions in the field of securities transactions do not
significantly change the legal standards, but they do create an increased
awareness of the problems and the limits imposed upon the financial com-
munity. It is well established now that a broker's duties to the investing
public take precedence over any conflicting duties to his customers or
advisees to whom he only owes a duty not to defraud them or profit at
their expense. The broker further has a duty to prevent his clients from
profiting at the expense of the uninformed public.
The recent SEC proceedings against Merrill Lynch should serve as
a warning to the remainder of the financial community. Regardless of
how prevalent activities such as those alleged in Merrill Lynch are, it
would now seem that the SEC is prepared to put an end to them, and
brokers would be well advised to examine their internal policies in re-
gard to disclosure of material inside information.
77 Supra note 43, at 741.
78 '61-'64 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Dec. ff 76,823, at 81,073 (1962).
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